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SPECIAL ARTICLE 
THE CASE FOR THE USE OF ANIMALS IN BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH 
CARL COHEN 
U
SING animals as research subjects in medical 
investigations is widely condemned on two 
grounds: first, because it wrongly violates the rights of 
animals, 1 and second, because it wrongly imposes on 
sentient creatures much avoidable sujfering.2 Neither 
of these arguments is sound. The first relies on a mis­
taken understanding of rights; the second relies on a 
mistaken calculation of consequences. Both deserve 
definitive dismissal. 
WHY ANIMALS HAVE No RIGHTS 
A right, properly understood, is a claim, or potential 
claim, that one party may exercise against another. 
The target against whom such a claim may be regis­
tered can be a single person, a group, a community, or 
(perhaps) all humankind. The content of rights claims 
also varies greatly: repayment of loans, nondiscrimi­
nation by employers, noninterference by the state, and 
so on. To comprehend any genuine right fully, there­
fore, we must know who holds the right, against whom it 
is held, and to what it is a right. 
From the Department of Philosophy of the University of Michigan and the 
University of Michigan Medical School, Ann Arbor. Address reprint requests to 
Professor Cohen at the Office of the Dean, University of Michigan Medical 
School, M7300 Medical Science Building I, Ann Arbor, MI 48109. 
Alternative sources of rights add complexity. Some 
rights are grounded in constitution and law (e.g., the 
right of an accused to trial by jury); some rights are 
moral but give no legal claims (e.g., my right to your 
keeping the promise you gave me); and some rights 
(e.g., against theft or assault) are rooted both in mor­
als and in law. 
The differing targets, contents, and sources of 
rights, and their inevitable conflict, together weave a 
tangled web. Notwithstanding all such complications, 
this much is clear about rights in general: they are in 
every case claims, or potential claims, within a com­
munity of moral agents. Rights arise, and can be intel­
. ligibly defended, only among beings who actually do, 
or can, make moral claims against one another. What­
ever else rights may be, therefore, they are necessarily 
human; their possessors are persons, human beings. 
The attributes of human beings from which this 
moral capability arises have been described variously 
by philosophers, both ancient and modern: the inner 
consciousness of a free will (Saint Augustine3 ); the 
grasp, by human reason, of the binding character of 
moral law (Saint Thomas4 ); the self-conscious partici­
pation of human beings in an objective ethical order 
(Hegel5 ); human membership in an organic moral 
community (Bradley6); the development of the hu-
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man self through the consciousness of other moral 
selves (Mead7 ); and the underivative, intuitive cogni­
tion of the rightness of an action (Prichard8 ). Most 
influential has been Immanuel Kant's emphasis on 
the universal human possession of a uniquely moral 
will and the autonomy its use entails.9 Humans con­
front choices that are purely moral; humans - but 
certainly not dogs or mice - lay down moral laws, for 
others and for themselves. Human beings are self­
legislative, morally auto-nomous. 
Animals ( that is, nonhuman animals, the ordinary 
sense of that word) lack this capacity for free moral 
judgment. They are not beings of a kind capable of 
exercising or responding to moral claims. Animals 
therefore have no rights, and they can have none. This 
is the core of the argument about the alleged rights 
of animals. The holders of rights must have the ca­
pacity to comprehend rules of duty, governing all 
including themselves. In applying such rules, the 
holders of rights must recognize possible conflicts 
between what is in their own interest and what is just. 
Only in a community of beings capable of self-restrict­
ing moral judgments can the concept of a right be 
correctly invoked. 
Humans have such moral capacities. They are in 
this sense self-legislative, are members of communities 
governed by moral rules, and do possess rights. Ani­
mals do not have such moral capacities. They are not 
morally self-legislative, cannot possibly be members 
of a truly moral community, and therefore cannot pos­
sess rights. In conducting research on animal subjects, 
therefore, we do not violate their rights, because they 
have none to violate. 
To animate life, even in its simplest forms, we give a 
certain natural reverence. But the possession of rights 
presupposes a moral status not attained by the vast 
majority of living things. We must not infer, therefore, 
that a live being has, simply in being alive, a "right" to 
its life. The assertion that all animals, only because 
they are alive and have interests, also possess the 
"right to life" 10 is an abuse of that phrase, and wholly 
without warrant. 
It does not follow from this,.however, that we are 
morally free to do anything we please to animals. Cer­
tainly not. In our dealings with animals, as in our 
dealings with other human beings, we have obliga­
tions that do not arise from claims against us based on 
rights. Rights entail obligations, but many of the 
things one ought to do are in no way tied to another's 
entitlement. Rights and obligations are not reciprocals 
of one another, and it is a serious mistake to suppose 
that they are. 
Illustrations are helpful. Obligations may arise 
from internal commitments made: physicians have ob­
ligations to their patients not grounded merely in their 
patients' rights. Teachers have such obligations to 
their students, shepherds to their dogs, and cowboys 
to their horses. Obligations may arise from differences 
of status: adults owe special care when playing with 
young children, and children owe special care when 
playing with young pets. Obligations may arise from 
special relationships: the payment of my son's college 
tuition is something to which he may have no right, 
although it may be my obligation to bear the burden 
if I reasonably can; my dog has no right to daily 
exercise and veterinary care, but I do have the obliga­
tion to provide these things for her. Obligations may 
arise from particular acts or circumstances: one may 
be obliged to another for a special kindness done, 
or obliged to put an animal out of its misery in view 
of its condition - although neither the human bene­
factor nor the dying animal may have had a claim of 
right. 
Plainly, the grounds of our obligations to humans 
and to animals are manifold and cannot be formulated 
simply. Some hold that there is a general obligation to 
do no gratuitous harm to sentient creatures (the prin­
ciple of nonmaleficence); some hold that there is a 
general obligation to do good to sentient creatures 
when that is reasonably within one's power ( the prin­
ciple of beneficence). In our dealings with animals, 
few will deny that we are at least obliged to act hu­
manely - that is, to treat them with the decency and 
concern that we owe, as sensitive human beings, to 
other sentient creatures. To treat animals humanely, 
however, is not to treat them as humans or as the 
holders of rights. 
A common objection, which deserves a response, 
may be paraphrased as follows: 
If having rights requires being able to make moral claims, to grasp 
and apply moral laws, then many humans - the brain-damaged, 
the comatose, the senile - who plainly lack those capacities must 
be without rights. But that is absurd. This proves [the critic 
concludes] that rights do not depend on the presence of moral 
capacities. 1• 10 
This objection fails; it mistakenly treats an essential 
feature of humanity as though it were a screen for 
sorting humans. The capacity for moral judgment that 
distinguishes humans from animals is not a test to be 
administered to human beings one by one. Persons 
who are unable, because of some disability, to perform 
the full moral functions natural to human beings are 
certainly not for that reason ejected from the moral 
community. The issue is one of kind. Humans are of 
such a kind that they may be the subject of experi­
ments only with their voluntary consent. The choices 
they make freely must be respected. Animals are of 
such a kind that it is impossible for them, in principle, 
to give or withhold voluntary consent or to make a 
moral choice. What humans retain when disabled, 
animals have never had. 
A second objection, also often made, may be para­
phrased as follows: 
Capacities will not succeed in distinguishing humans from the other 
animals. Animals also reason; animals also communicate with one 
another; animals also care passionately for their young; animals also 
exhibit desires and preferences.11• 12 Features of moral relevance -
rationality, interdependence, and love-are not exhibited uniquely 
by human beings. Therefore [this critic concludes], there can be no 
solid moral distinction between humans and other animals. 10 
This criticism misses the central point. It is not the 
ability to communicate or to reason, or dependence on 
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one another, or care for the young, or the exhibition of 
preference, or any such behavior that marks the criti­
cal divide. Analogies between human families and 
those of monkeys, or between human communities 
and those of wolves, and the like, are entirely beside 
the point. Patterns of conduct are not at issue. Ani­
mals do indeed exhibit remarkable behavior at times. 
Conditioning, fear, instinct, and intelligence all con­
tribute to species survival. Membership in a commu­
nity of moral agents nevertheless remains impossible 
for them. Actors subject to moral judgment must be 
capable of grasping the generality of an ethical prem­
ise in a practical syllogism. Humans act immorally 
often enough, but only they - never wolves or mon­
keys - can discern, by applying some moral rule to 
the facts of a case, that a given act ought or ought 
not to be performed. The moral restraints imposed 
by humans on themselves are thus highly abstract 
and are often in conflict with the self-interest of 
the agent. Communal behavior among animals, even 
when most intelligent and most endearing, does not 
approach autonomous morality in this fundamental 
sense. 
Genuinely moral acts have an internal as well as an 
external dimension. Thus, in law, an act can be crimi­
nal only when the guilty deed, the actus rem;, is done 
with a guilty mind, mens rea. No animal can ever 
commit a crime; bringing animals to criminal trial is 
the mark of primitive ignorance. The claims of moral 
right are similarly inapplicable to them. Does a lion 
have a right to eat a baby zebra? Does a baby zebra 
have a right not to be eaten? Such questions, mis­
takenly invoking the concept of right where it does 
not belong, do not make good sense. Those who con­
demn biomedical research because it violates "animal 
rights" commit the same blunder. 
IN DEFENSE OF "SPECIESISM" 
Abandoning reliance on animal rights, some critics 
resort instead to animal sentience - their feelings of 
pain and distress. We ought to desist from the imposi­
tion of pain insofar as we can. Since all or nearly all 
experimentation on animals does- impose pain and 
could be readily forgone, say these critics, it should be 
stopped. The ends sought may be worthy, but those 
ends do not justify imposing agonies on humans, and 
by animals the agonies are felt no less. The laboratory 
use of animals (these critics conclude) must therefore 
be ended - or at least very sharply curtailed. 
Argument of this variety is essentially utilitarian, 
often expressly so 13 ; it is based on the calculation of 
the net product, in pains and pleasures, resulting from 
experiments on animals.Jeremy Bentham, comparing 
horses and dogs with other sentient creatures, is thus 
commonly quoted: "The question is not, Can they 
reason? nor Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?" 14 
Animals certainly can suffer and surely ought not to 
be made to suffer needlessly. But in inferring, from 
these uncontroversial premises, that biomedical re­
search causing animal distress is largely (or wholly) 
wrong, the critic commits two serious errors. 
The first error is the assumption, often explicitly 
defended, that all sentient animals have equal moral 
standing. Between a dog and a human being, accord­
ing to this view, there is no moral difference; hence the 
pains suffered by dogs must be weighed no differently 
from the pains suffered by humans. To deny such 
equality, according to this critic, is to give unjust pref­
erence to one species over another; it is "speciesism." 
The most influential statement of this moral equality 
of species was made by Peter Singer: 
The racist violates the principle of equality by giving greater weight 
to the interests of members of his own race when there is a clash 
between their interests and the interests of those of another race. 
The sexist violates the principle of equality by favoring the interests 
of his own sex. Similarly the speciesist allows the interests of his 
own species to override the greater interests of members of other 
species. The pattern is identical in each case.2 
This argument is worse than unsound; it is atro­
cious. It draws an offensive moral conclusion from a 
deliberately devised verbal parallelism that is utterly 
specious. Racism has no rational ground whatever. 
Differing degrees of respect or concern for humans for 
no other reason than that they are members of differ­
ent races is an injustice totally without foundation in 
the nature of the races themselves. Racists, even if 
acting on the basis of mistaken factual beliefs, do 
grave moral wrong precisely because there is no mor­
ally relevant distinction among the races. The suppo­
sition of such differences has led to outright horror. 
The same is true of the sexes, neither sex being enti­
tled by right to greater respect or concern than the 
other. No dispute here. 
Between species of animate life, however - be­
tween (for example) humans on the one hand and cats 
or rats on the other - the morally relevant differences 
are enormous, and almost universally appreciated. 
Humans engage in moral reflection; humans are mor­
ally autonomous; humans are members of moral com­
munities, recognizing just claims against their own 
interest. Human beings do have rights; theirs is a mor­
al status very different from that of cats or rats. 
I am a speciesist. Speciesism is not merely plausible; 
it is essential for right conduct, because those who will 
not make the morally relevant distinctions among spe­
cies are almost certain, in consequence, to misappre­
hend their true obligations. The analogy between spe­
ciesism and racism is insidious. Every sensitive moral 
judgment requires that the differing natures of the 
beings to whom obligations are owed be considered. If 
all forms of animate life - or vertebrate animal life? 
- must be treated equally, and if therefore in evaluat­
ing a research program the pains of a rodent count 
equally with the pains of a human, we are forced to 
conclude (1) that neither humans nor rodents possess 
rights, or (2) that rodents possess all the rights that 
humans possess. Both alternatives are absurd. Yet one 
or the other must be swallowed if the moral equality of 
all species is to be defended. 
Humans owe to other humans a degree of moral 
regard that cannot be owed to animals. Some humans 
take on the obligation to support and heal others, both 
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humans and animals, as a principal duty in their lives; 
the fulfillment of that duty may require the sacrifice of 
many animals. If biomedical investigators abandon 
the effective pursuit of their professional objectives 
because they are convinced that they may not do to 
animals what the service of humans requires, they will 
fail, objectively, to do their duty. Refusing to recognize 
the moral differences among species is a sure path to 
calamity. (The largest animal rights group in the 
country is People for the Ethical Treatment of Ani­
mals; its codirector, Ingrid Newkirk, calls research 
using animal subjects "fascism" and "supremacism." 
"Animal liberationists do not separate out the human 
animal," she says, "so there is no rational basis for 
saying that a human being has special rights. A rat is a 
pig is a dog is a boy. They're all mammals. " 1 5 ) 
Those who claim to base their objection to the use 
of animals in biomedical research on their reckoning 
of the net pleasures and pains produced make a sec­
ond error, equally grave. Even if it were true - as it is 
surely not - that the pains of all animate beings must 
be counted equally, a cogent utilitarian calculation 
requires that we weigh all the consequences of the use, 
and of the nonuse, of animals in laboratory research. 
Critics relying (however mistakenly) on animal rights 
may claim to ignore the beneficial results of such re­
search, rights being trump cards to which interest and 
advantage must give way. But an argument that is 
explicitly framed in terms of interest and benefit for all 
over the long run must attend also to the disadvanta­
geous consequences of not using animals in research, 
and to all the achievements attained and attainable 
only through their use. The sum of the benefits of their 
use is utterly beyond quantification. The elimination 
of horrible disease, the increase of longevity, the 
avoidance of great pain, the saving of lives, and the 
improvement of the quality of lives (for humans and 
for animals) achieved through research using animals 
is so incalculably great that the argument of these 
critics, systematically pursued, establishes not their 
conclusion but its reverse: to refrain from using ani­
mals in biomedical research is, on utilitarian grounds, 
morally wrong. 
When balancing the pleasures and pains resulting 
from the use of animals in research, we must not fail to 
place on the scales the terrible pains that would have 
resulted, would be suffered now, and would long con­
tinue had animals not been used. Every disease elimi­
nated, every vaccine developed, every method of pain 
relief devised, every surgical procedure invented, ev­
ery prosthetic device implanted - indeed, virtually 
every modern medical therapy is due, in part or in 
whole, to experimentation using animals. Nor may we 
ignore, in the balancing process, the predictable gains 
in human (and animal) well-being that are probably 
achievable in the future but that will not be achieved if 
the decision is made now to desist from such research 
or to curtail it. 
Medical investigators are seldom insensitive to the 
distress their work may cause animal subjects. Oppo-
nents of research using animals are frequently insensi­
tive to the cruelty of the results of the restrictions they 
would impose.2 Untold numbers of human beings -
real persons, although not now identifiable - would 
suffer grievously as the consequence of this well­
meaning but shortsighted tenderness. If the morally 
relevant differences between humans and animals are 
borne in mind, and if all relevant considerations are 
weighed, the calculation of long-term consequences 
must give overwhelming support for biomedical re­
search using animals. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Substitution 
The humane treatment of animals requires that we 
desist from experimenting on them if we can accom­
plish the same result using alternative methods - in 
vitro experimentation, computer simulation, or oth­
ers. Critics of some experiments using animals rightly 
make this point. 
It would be a serious error to suppose, however, 
that alternative techniques could soon be used in most 
research now using live animal subjects. No other 
methods now on the horizon - or perhaps ever to be 
available - can fully replace the testing of a drug, a 
procedure, or a vaccine, in live organisms. The flood 
of new medical possibilities being opened by the suc­
cesses of recombinant DNA technology will turn to a 
trickle if testing on live animals is forbidden. When 
initial trials entail great risks, there may be no forward 
movement whatever without the use of live animal 
subjects. In seeking knowledge that may prove critical 
in later clinical applications, the unavailability of ani­
mals for inquiry may spell complete stymie. In the 
United States, federal regulations require the testing 
of new drugs and other products on animals, for effica­
cy and safety, before human beings are exposed to 
them. 1 6• 1 7  We would not want it otherwise. 
Every advance in medicine - every new drug, new 
operation, new therapy of any kind - must sooner or 
later be tried on a living being for the first time. That 
trial, controlled or uncontrolled, will be an experi­
ment. The subject of that experiment, if it is not an 
animal, will be a human being. Prohibiting the use of 
live animals in biomedical research, therefore, or 
sharply restricting it, must result either in the block­
age of much valuable research or in the replacement 
of animal subjects with human subjects. These are the 
consequences - unacceptable to most reasonable per­
sons - of not using animals in research. 
Reduction 
Should we not at least reduce the use of animals in 
biomedical research? No, we should increase it, to 
avoid when feasible the use of humans as experimen­
tal subjects. Medical investigations putting human 
subjects at some risk are numerous and greatly varied. 
The risks run in such experiments are usually un­
avoidable, and (thanks to earlier experiments on ani-
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mals) most such risks are minimal or moderate. But 
some experimental risks are substantial. 
When an experimental protocol that entails sub­
stantial risk to humans comes before an institutional 
review board, what response is appropriate? The in­
vestigation, we may suppose, is promising and de­
serves support, so long as its human subjects are pro­
tected against unnecessary dangers. May not the 
investigators be fairly asked, Have you done all that 
you can to eliminate risk to humans by the extensive 
testing of that drug, that procedure, or that device on 
animals? To achieve maximal safety for humans we 
are right to require thorough experimentation on ani­
mal subjects before humans are involved. 
Opportunities to increase human safety in this way 
are commonly missed; trials in which risks may be 
shifted from humans to animals are often not devised, 
sometimes not even considered. Why? For the investi­
gator, the use of animals as subjects is often more 
expensive, in money and time, than the use of human 
subjects . Access to suitable human subjects is often 
quick and convenient, whereas access to appropriate 
animal subjects may be awkward, costly, and bur­
dened with red tape. Physician-investigators have 
often had more experience working with human be­
ings and know precisely where the needed pool of sub­
jects is to be found and how they may be enlisted. 
Animals, and the procedures for their use, are often 
less familiar to these investigators . Moreover, the use 
of animals in place of humans is now more likely to be 
the target of zealous protests from without. The up­
shot is that humans are sometimes subjected to risks 
that animals could have borne, and should have 
borne, in their place. To maximize the protection of 
human subjects , I conclude, the wide and imaginative 
use of live animal subjects should be encouraged rath­
er than discouraged. This enlargement in the use of 
animals is our obligation. 
Consistency 
Finally, inconsistency between the profession and 
the practice of many who oppose research using ani­
mals deserves comment .  This frankly ad hominem ob­
servation aims chiefly to show that a coherent position 
rejecting the use of animals in medical research im­
poses costs so high as to be intolerable even to the 
critics themselves. 
One cannot coherently object to the killing of ani­
mals in biomedical investigations while continuing to 
eat them. Anesthetics and thoughtful animal hus­
bandry render the level of actual animal distress in the 
laboratory generally lower than that in the abattoir. 
So long as death and discomfort do not substantially 
differ in the two contexts, the consistent objector must 
not only refrain from all eating of animals but also 
protest as vehemently against others eating them as 
against others experimenting on them. No less vigor­
ously must the critic object to the wearing of animal 
hides in coats and shoes, to employment in any indus­
trial enterprise that uses animal parts, and to any 
commercial development that will cause death or dis­
tress to animals . 
Killing animals to meet human needs for food, 
clothing, and shelter is judged entirely reasonable by 
most persons. The ubiquity of these uses and the vir­
tual universality of moral support for them confront 
the opponent of research using animals with an in­
escapable difficulty. How can the many common uses 
of animals be judged morally worthy, while their use 
in scientific investigation is judged unworthy? 
The number of animals used in research is but the 
tiniest fraction of the total used to satisfy assorted 
human appetites. That these appetites, often base and 
satisfiable in other ways, morally justify the far larger 
consumption of animals , whereas the quest for im­
proved human health and understanding cannot justi­
fy the far smaller, is wholly implausible. Aside from 
the numbers of animals involved, the distinction in 
terms of worthiness of use, drawn with regard to any 
single animal, is not defensible. A given sheep is surely 
not more justifiably used to put lamb chops on the 
supermarket counter than to serve in testing a new 
contraceptive or a new prosthetic device. The need­
less killing of animals is wrong; if the common kill­
ing of them for our food or convenience is right, the 
less common but more humane uses of animals in 
the service of medical science are certainly not less 
right. 
Scrupulous vegetarianism, in matters of food, cloth­
ing, shelter, commerce, and recreation, and in all oth­
er spheres, is the only fully coherent position the critic 
may adopt. At great human cost, the lives of fish and 
crustaceans must also be protected, with equal vigor, 
if speciesism has been forsworn. A very few consistent 
critics adopt this position. It is the reductio ad absur­
dum of the rejection of moral distinctions between 
animals and human beings. 
Opposition to the use of animals in research is 
based on arguments of two different kinds - those 
relying on the alleged rights of anirri.als and those rely­
ing on the consequences for animals. I have argued 
that arguments of both kinds must fail. We surely do 
have obligations to animals, but they have, and can 
have, no rights against us on which research can in­
fringe. In calculating the consequences of animal re­
search, we must weigh all the long-term benefits of the 
results achieved - to animals and to humans - and 
in that calculation we must not assume the moral 
equality of all animate species . 
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MEDICAL INTELLIGENCE 
CURRENT CONCEPTS 
CONTROL OF ASTHMA BY AEROSOLS 
MICHAEL T. NEWHOUSE, M.D. , 
AND MYRNA B. D0Lov1cH, P.ENo. 
P
HYSICIANS have been intrigued with the idea of 
inhalation therapy for more than a century, since 
patients were advised to smoke cigarettes containing 
anticholinergic botanicals such as Datura stramonium to 
obtain relief from asthma attacks .  1 
The use of aerosols to treat asthma allows an almost 
ideal therapeutic ratio to be achieved, since minute 
doses of inhaled medication provide optimal mainte­
nance therapy with minimal side effects. 2•6 In severe 
acute asthma, sympathomimetic bronchodilator aero­
sols are superior to systemic therapy with the same 
agents.7•8 In chronic asthma, adrenoceptor-agonist 
aerosols provide greater and more rapid bronchodila­
tation and are also more effective in preventing air­
way responses to exercise and histamine than the oral 
form of the same medications. 9- 1 2  Although sympa­
thomimetic aerosols are more effective than oral or 
intravenous medications, they cause much less trem­
or, tachycardia, palpitations, and anxiety {which are 
commonly experienced with the oral or intravenous 
therapy) .7 , I 3, I 4  Similarly, inhaled topically potent ste­
roids have been shown to act effectively in the pro­
phylactic management of moderately severe asthma, 
without causing the serious complications of long­
term treatment with systemic steroids.6 A variety of 
relatively selective �2-sympathomimetic agents (albu­
terol, fenoterol, terbutaline, and bitolterol), anticho­
linergic bronchodilators {ipratropium bromide and 
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methylatropine nitrate), and antiallergic and anti­
inflammatory drugs ( cromolyn and various steroids) 
are now available as aerosols and are frequently able 
(alone or in combination) to control all but the most 
severe cases of chronic asthma, without the addition 
of oral medication. 3•6 
AEROSOL GENERATION, CHARACTERISTICS, 
AND DELIVERY 
Therapeutic aerosols used in the treatment of re­
versible airflow obstruction may be produced either 
by metered-dose inhalers, which provide unit doses of 
medication from fluorocarbon-pressurized canisters or 
from capsules, or by continuously or intermittently 
generated wet aerosols from ultrasonic or jet nebu­
lizers that contain drug solutions {which patients usu­
ally inhale by tidal breathing). Devices for intermit­
tent positive-pressure breathing are now rarely used to 
deliver therapeutic aerosols except to patients with 
respiratory failure who need assisted ventilation. 
The deposition of aerosol in the lower respiratory 
tract is a function of inertial impaction and sedi­
mentation due to gravity. These processes depend 
in turn on the size of the aerosol 1 5 , I 6  and the respira­
tory variables - namely, inspiratory flow rate, fre­
quency, tidal volume, breath-holding time, 1 7·20 and 
airway caliber. I 6,2 1 ,22 Aerosol generators used for thera­
peutic purposes produce aerosol particles that are 
0.5 to 35 µm in diameter.23•24 However, only parti­
cles with aerodynamic diameters of I to 5 µm are 
efficiently deposited in the lower respiratory tract 1 5 ; 
these represent, even under optimal inhalation condi­
tions, only 1 3  percent of the output from a metered­
dose inhaler 1 7  and only l to 5 percent of that from 
most nebulizers.4•23 Increased inspiratory flow rates, 
as in patients with acute asthma, result in increased 
losses because of impaction of the aerosol particles in 
the upper airway and at the bifurcations of the first 
few bronchial divisions. 1 9  When inspiratory flow rates 
are maintained below l liter per second, deposition of 
particles with diameters of I to 5 µm in the pulmonary 
airways is increased 1 7  and bronchodilatation is en­
hanced. 25 Furthermore, because particles with diame­
ters less than 5 µm need up to two seconds to settle 
onto the walls of terminal bronchioles and much long­
er in central airways, 1 6  breath-holding for about 1 0  
seconds after inhalation of the aerosol will also result 
in increased deposition of the aerosol and improved 
